Anticipatory emotions precede behavioral outcomes and provide a means to infer interactions between emotional and cognitive processes. A number of theories hold that anticipatory emotions serve as inputs to the decision process and code the value or risk associated with a stimulus. We argue that current data do not unequivocally support this theory. We present an alternative theory whereby anticipatory emotions reflect the outcome of a decision process and serve to ready the subject for new information when making an uncertain response. We test these two accounts, which we refer to as emotions-as-input and emotions-as-outcome, in a task that allows risky stimuli to be dissociated from uncertain responses. We find that emotions are associated with responses as opposed to stimuli. This finding is contrary to the emotions-as-input perspective as it shows that emotions arise from decision processes.
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Introduction
As cognitive science continues to seek connections between biological and social factors, it will become increasingly critical to understand the role that emotion and physiology play in information processing. One central finding in this pursuit is that physiological markers of emotion (i.e., skin conductance responses; SCRs) occur prior to particular types of choices in decision-making tasks, suggesting that covert emotions can affect cognition. While a variety of theories attempt to characterize the causal factors that generate these emotions, as well as the psychological function of emotions, most extant theories assume that these anticipatory emotions carry information about the value of particular choices, and thus serve as inputs to the decision process. In this paper, we develop an alternate account in which emotions arise from the decision-making process, and carry information about the uncertainty or contextual novelty associated with a decision. We develop a framework that helps to clarify the functional role and theory behind these two descriptions of anticipatory emotions, which we refer to as emotionsas-input and emotions-as-outcome, and suggests ways in which these two views can be dissociated. We use this framework to understand how emotions affect performance in choice tasks in general and test the framework's predictions in a categorization task in particular.
The canonical example of anticipatory emotions in a cognitive task comes from work on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997) . In this task, there are two primary types of stimuli: decks of cards that are associated with overall positive outcomes and decks that are associated with overall negative outcomes. Importantly, the individual trial outcomes associated with either stimulus type are variable, and thus are difficult for subjects to learn. However, the variability in outcome is not constant across stimuli; in standard versions of the task the negative decks are appreciably more variable and produce large rewards as well as large losses.
The key finding in this task is that neurologically intact subjects show increased skin conductance responses (SCRs) prior to making choices involving the negative stimuli (Bechara et al., 1997) . Because SCR has historically been
